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ABSTRACT 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998) has 
become a widely used method of measuring individuals’ implicit preferences based on the speed 
of sorting words or images into respective categories in a computerized task. Age IATs have 
been used to ascertain implicit preference judgments towards young and old faces and to 
compare these ratings with explicit, self-reported age-related measures. Generally, research has 
found a positive relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes, as well as an overall bias 
towards younger age. However, in examining the relations between explicit beliefs about aging 
and implicit age preferences, the individual factors that might influence this relationship have not 
been fully explored. The present study seeks to examine the role that mood, specifically anxiety 
and depression, may play on influencing that relationship. Consistent with previous research, our 
results found a positive relationship between explicit beliefs and implicit age preferences. 
Further, negative mood was shown to predict implicit age attitudes above and beyond the 
predictive ability of explicit beliefs. The implications of these findings are discussed in the 
context of better understanding the differences between explicit and implicit attitudes of age.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Implicit attitudes are defined as automatic, unconscious preferences that do not require 
conscious introspection to be measured (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). The Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998) has been used to measure 
implicit preferences across a variety of subjects, including attitudes about the self and others. 
Implicit attitudes are often correlated in research with explicit, self-reported attitudes, or with 
other related constructs. What is overlooked, though, is the impact that individual factors may 
have on the relationship between implicit and explicit views. In the present study, the influence 
of individuals’ moods, specifically depression and anxiety, is considered in its relation to implicit 
and explicit attitudes towards old age. Research has shown that high anxiety individuals report 
more rumination and worry but less future-oriented thoughts, suggesting that such individuals 
may perpetuate their anxiety through negatively-biased thoughts about their current state 
(Hughes, Alloy, & Cogswell, 2008). However, anxiety has not been considered in how it may 
specifically relate to ageist attitudes. Depressive symptoms are linked to a negative cognitive 
viewpoint and biases towards negative stimuli (e.g., Beck, 1967), but again, depressed mood has 
not been examined in how it might shape attitudes towards older adults. Measures on anxiety, 
depression, implicit age attitudes, and explicit beliefs about one’s aging were used to ascertain 
the role that mood factors would play on the association between implicit and explicit aging 
attitudes. We found that measures of negative mood not only correlated with both explicit and 
implicit aging beliefs, but also explained implicit age biases when controlling for explicit beliefs. 
The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of better understanding the 
differences between explicit and implicit attitudes of age and how they impact older adults. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
Implicit attitudes are cognitions that are unconsciously held and considered to be 
automatic associations, sometimes held without full conscious realization (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). These 
automatic preferences are theorized to take one of two forms. They may either be below 
conscious abilities to retrieve, similar to a forgotten memory, or be in some way undesirable for 
an individual to want to share openly, such as socially unacceptable views or views that are 
dissonant from one’s schemas or publicly-shared beliefs (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek et 
al., 2007). Nosek and colleagues (2007) further state that retrieval of implicit attitudes does not 
require conscious reflection or introspection, but can be achieved without deliberate intention. 
Explicit attitudes, on the other hand, are those beliefs of which we are both consciously aware 
and willing to share with others. Commonly measured through self-report, these are attitudes 
which we propose to hold as true and find socially allowable for others to know. Because it is 
possible to be consciously aware of an attitude but unwilling to share it, it becomes important to 
look to implicit attitudes to uncover more genuine assessments of preferences. Further, 
examining the underlying differences between explicit and implicit reporting provides useful 
information on what factors contribute to this discrepancy. Evidence exists of both convergent 
and discriminant validity between implicit and explicit attitudes (Nosek & Smyth, 2007). 
Research has not only shown that explicit attitudes do not fully predict or explain implicit 
attitudes, but that other factors—such as social desirability, self-preservation, and affect—may 
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be involved besides explanations of explicit and implicit attitudes as related but distinct 
constructs (Cherry, Allen, Denver, & Holland, 2015; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). 
Implicit Association Tests and Age 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) has become 
a widely used method of measuring an individual’s implicit preferences based on their 
association of a category (e.g., black people, obese people) with a judgment (e.g., bad, lazy) 
toward numerous topics, including gender roles, political alignments, and sexual orientations. In 
a computerized task, individuals are asked to sort words or images into the appropriate category 
on the screen by using corresponding keystrokes that match the displayed location of the 
category. The categories are presented dually, that is, paired with another category, typically one 
social and one evaluative in nature (e.g.,  normal weight/obese body images and good and bad 
words might be paired as normal weight images with good words and obese images with bad 
words). After acclimation trials with just one category being sorted at a time, the heart of the test 
begins: participants must now sort both the topical and judgment categories at the same time, 
with one response choice of each sharing a keystroke for the duration of a trial block. The 
pairings are switched to be counterbalanced in the next block (e.g., obese with bad one block, 
obese with good the next block), so that a “congruent” block, that is, a block of trials where the 
word pairings are in line with the researcher’s expectations (e.g., obese and bad) and an 
“incongruent” block exist. The speed and accuracy at which an individual responds on trials is 
calculated into a preference score, which is thought to operationalize implicit attitudes toward the 
category, object, or peoples covered in that test. The basis of this logic is that strongly associated 
words will be more quickly categorized (as shown through reaction times) when they are 
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congruently paired (e.g., share the same response key) as opposed to when they are 
incongruently paired (Coates & Campbell, 2010).  
IATs have been used extensively in measuring implicit attitudes, with topics of the 
research spanning social, political, and personal realms. In addition to the topics of gender roles, 
political alignments, and sexual orientations mentioned above, IAT research has also focused on 
weight, race, and disability biases and stigma (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001; Hummert, Garstka, O’Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002; Wang, Brownell, & Wadden, 
2004). Criticisms of IATs have centered on the validity and reliability of the tests, most notably 
when their usage strays from the original measurement intentions of the creators (Blanton et al., 
2009; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). However, supporters of the IAT have produced 
numerous studies to combat criticisms against the reliability of the measure and have 
successfully addressed or further specified many ambiguities, in particular about measurement, 
order effects, and interpretation (e.g., Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; McConnell & Leibold, 
2009; Nosek et al., 2005). Despite the criticisms that remain, IATs are considered a valid manner 
of measuring implicit preferences within the guidelines provided by the authors for methods and 
interpretation. 
Age-related IATs have often been used to ascertain implicit valence judgments towards 
young and old adults, and to compare these ratings with explicit age-related measures (e.g., 
Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Research on age IATs 
has shown that implicit attitudes suggest a bias towards the young and show varying levels of 
associations with explicit measures of ageism and old age beliefs (Greenwald et al., 2003; 
Hummert et al., 2002; Mingzheng, 2005; Nosek et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2007). Findings 
demonstrate that both old and young participants, male and female, tend to show a pro-young 
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implicit bias, although older adults express it less when self-reporting (Nosek et al., 2007). 
Nosek and colleagues (2007) also found that the pro-young trend persists across all the 
ethnicities measured. However, explicit beliefs cannot fully predict implicit beliefs, suggesting 
that other factors may play into the difference between the two constructs. 
In examining the relations between explicit age views and implicit age preferences, 
research has focused on explicit attitudes (i.e. prejudice) against old age and older adults 
(Hummert et al., 2002; Mingzheng, 2005; Nosek et al., 2002). To our knowledge, studies have 
not considered how the individual’s beliefs about their own personal aging trajectory might 
impact implicit age attitudes. Expectations for one’s own aging process, though, are intuitively 
likely to affect and be affected by implicit attitudes about age. Although it is a well-known fact 
that aging is inevitable, how one approaches the idea of his/her own aging expectations is likely 
to be heavily influenced by his/her personal, current outlook on life. This outlook, be it 
pessimistic or optimistic, may potentially play a role in determining an individual’s implicit 
attitudes towards older age; however, the individual factors that might influence this relationship 
have not been fully explored.  
Individual Factors of Mood 
Implicit Association Tests have provided useful information on implicit preferences 
across many variables. In interpreting these findings, though, it is critical to take into account 
individual factors which may impact biases, especially when considering the highly personal 
topic of aging. Given the suppressive impact that social desirability can have on explicit aging 
beliefs (Cherry et al., 2015), it is important to explore theoretically relevant factors that might 
explain some of the difference between implicit performance and explicit reporting. Anxiety and 
depression are explored here as mood factors that may relate to aging attitudes. Both are 
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associated with maladaptive views rooted in dysfunctional schemas, beliefs, and cognitions. In 
the context of Age IATs, it is possible that anxious and depressive symptoms may impact 
preference results due to the relevance of personal aging to one’s own beliefs and ideas about 
older age.  
Anxiety 
Previous research on anxiety and age attitudes has demonstrated that individuals high in 
aging-specific anxiety or in anxiety about contact with older adults express more negative 
attitudes and show more avoidant behavior (e.g., less social contact) towards old people than 
low-anxiety counterparts (Bousfield & Hutchison, 2010; Greenberg, Schimel, & Martens, 2002; 
Wisdom, Connor, Hogan, & Callahan, 2014). The relationship between anxiety and ageism has 
also been linked through findings that those who have high anxiety about aging tend to hold 
more ageist beliefs (Wisdom et al., 2014). Research exploring explicit and implicit anxiety self-
reports has also shown that trait anxiety influences implicit anxiety task performance regardless 
of whether state anxiety is manipulated beforehand. Specifically, researchers challenged whether 
induced anxiety was the only influence on anxiety IAT scores and found that trait anxiety, with 
no situational anxiety priming, impacted participants’ performance on an anxiety-IAT (Huang, 
Yang, Miao, Lu, & Zhu, 2012). Although this report specifically measured the impact of anxiety 
on an anxiety-specific IAT, both the nature of their findings and the relationship between anxiety 
and aging suggest that anxiety may influence scores on other IATs as well. 
While it is important to consider how aging-specific anxiety may influence aging 
attitudes as well as how self-reported anxiety may relate to implicit anxiety measures, it is 
equally informative to explore how more general anxiety may impact implicit age attitudes. 
Shifting the focus from what past research has done, we intend to examine whether anxiety 
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interacts with the relationship of explicit and implicit aging biases, operationalizing anxiety by 
either one’s current general mood or one’s characteristic levels of symptoms. In one study, 
induced, acute anxiety was shown to impact implicit depression and self-esteem (Creemers, 
Scholte, Engels, Pieter, & Wiers, 2013). To our knowledge, though, state and trait anxiety have 
not been considered in how they may relate to ageist attitudes. Given that anxiety is defined in 
part by a worry about the future and a lower activation threshold for attending to perceived 
threats, we intend to explore how this might impact implicit attitudes about older adults. 
Individuals high on anxiety have reported more rumination and worry but less future-oriented 
thought or planning, suggesting that anxious individuals may perpetuate their anxiety through 
negatively-biased thoughts about their current state (Hughes, Alloy, & Cogswell, 2008). In a 
study that controlled for depression, severity of anxiety symptoms was found to relate negatively 
to quality of life and psychosocial functioning (D’Avanzato et al., 2013). Findings such as these 
suggest that highly anxious individuals view the state of their lives pessimistically and thus judge 
their current status—perhaps including their age—as undesirable and their quality of life poor. 
Anxiety symptoms are also known to be highly comorbid with depression, which may also 
impact one’s attitudes about age due to its association with negative cognitions. 
Depression 
Depressed individuals are often characterized by their negative outlook on life. Depressed 
mood is associated with a cognitive bias towards focusing on negative occurrences that exhibits 
itself through a greater difficulty shifting attention away from negative stimuli or events in the 
environment because these are congruent with their negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Depression typically includes rumination, negative thoughts, negative schemas, and negative 
views towards the present, and a more basic, conscious attentional bias towards negative stimuli 
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(Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Meta-analysis has shown that this 
attention bias in depressed individuals remained stronger than in non-depressed individuals even 
when other factors such as age, gender, or method of measurement were considered (Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010). A review of the mechanisms underlying depression also supports the 
idea that depression develops and is perpetuated by a cognitive bias towards processing negative 
information about one’s self and one’s environment, which leads to the creation of dysfunctional 
schemas that thereby perpetuate the individual’s poor mood by increasing their selective 
attention to schema-consistent (i.e., negative) stimuli and decreasing their awareness of schema-
inconsistent (i.e., positive) environmental information (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Disner, 
Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011).  Depression has also been associated with having a negative 
self-image or self-concept and was found to relate to less optimistic biases about self-perceptions 
and less self-enhancement in cognitions than non-depressed individuals (Alloy, Wagner, Black, 
Gerstein, & Abramson, 2011). Further, low implicit self-esteem has been shown to relate with 
being clinically depressed (Risch et al., 2010). Given the association between depression and 
negative thoughts and feelings, an evaluation of one’s self—including their age group—may not 
be as positive for a depressed individual than for someone without depressive symptoms.  
Summary 
Older adults are often stigmatized, negatively stereotyped to be deficient in physical, 
cognitive, and social functioning (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 2002) and consequently can be 
subjected to patronizing or belittling treatment (Castelli, Zecchini, Deamicis, & Sherman, 2005). 
The impact of ageist behaviors on older adults’ quality of life is generally driven by ageist 
attitudes. It is important to explore the nature of the attitudes underlying these behaviors and 
judgments in younger adults and to tease apart the differences between the expression of explicit 
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and implicit attitudes, since implicit measures more directly relate to behavior, yet still can differ 
significantly from explicitly stated attitudes. Age IATs are often used to measure implicit 
prejudice against older adults, yet research has shown that explicit self-reports on ageist beliefs 
have varying correlation with implicit attitudes. Examining the relationship between explicitly 
reported views on aging and implicitly held ageist attitudes paints a better picture of one’s beliefs 
about aging and is informative in predicting how one might behave towards an older adult as 
well. Explicit attitudes cannot fully predict implicitly-held attitudes, and one reason for this 
difference may be the influence of affect or mood factors of the individual that impact their 
attitudes. Anxiety and depression both involve dysfunctional cognitions about the self, others, 
and events, but neither has been examined in the context of how symptom levels may also 
influence implicit attitudes towards older adulthood. Exploring the role of mood factors on the 
relationship between explicit and implicit age biases may provide useful information for 
interpreting how age-related attitudes are determined. 
Study Aims 
There are two primary aims of this study: (1) establishing the existence of specific 
variable relationships and (2) exploring the predictive contributions of these variables on implicit 
age attitudes. First, the authors seek to confirm previous findings of the relationship between 
explicit beliefs and implicit age preferences. This relationship has been demonstrated in previous 
research (Greenwald et al., 2003; Hummert et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2007), 
but it has not been explored with explicit age preferences defined as personal expectations 
considering one’s own aging. Because it is likely that aging expectations would be associated 
with implicit age attitudes, and because measuring explicit attitudes in this way is a new angle of 
approach for examining the implicit/explicit age attitudes relationship, establishing a relationship 
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between aging expectations and implicit age attitudes has the potential to increase our broader 
understanding of  these constructs. In addition, the authors aim to explore whether negative 
mood, specifically anxiety and depression levels, is associated with implicit aging scores. 
Although previous studies have found a negative relationship between aging expectations and 
mood symptoms (Li et al., 2013; Sarkisian et al., 2005), to our knowledge, no research has 
directly tested whether relationships exist between depressive and anxious symptoms and 
implicit age attitudes.  
With regard to the second aim of this study, we seek to determine whether explicit 
measures of one’s own beliefs about aging are predictive of implicit aging biases. Further, we 
intend to explore how depression and anxiety levels may impact the predictive relationship 
between explicit and implicit age-related attitudes and may explain implicit scores above and 
beyond the explanatory abilities of explicit measures alone. As mentioned above, a negative 
relationship between aging expectations and mood symptoms has been observed in previous 
research (Li et al., 2013; Sarkisian et al., 2005). Determining how mood factors that may 
contribute to or influence the explicit/implicit attitude relationship is important not only for 
knowing the limitations of this relation but also, in the context of aging, for understanding how 
the symptomology of the individual who demonstrates an implicit and/or explicit bias may play a 
role in their perception of older age. 
In sum, the specific aims and hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
 Aim 1, Hypothesis 1: To confirm previous findings of an association between implicit 
age preference scores and explicit aging-related measures. Based on previous literature, 
we hypothesize that explicit measures of aging beliefs about the self, specifically the 
Expectations Regarding Aging Survey (ERA-12; Sarkisian, Steers, Hays, & Mangione, 
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2005), will be correlated with age IAT scores. The ERA-12 has three domain-specific 
subscales, namely, Mental Health, Physical Health, and Cognitive Function. We expect 
that higher scores on these three subscales will each be positively and independently 
associated with higher implicit attitude scores, that is, with greater implicit bias against 
older adults. Research has shown that explicit biases against older adults relate to similar 
implicit biases (Greenwald et al., 2003; Hummert, Garstka, O’Brien, Greenwald, & 
Mellott, 2002; Nosek et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2007). While these explicit measures look 
at opinions about others, the ERA-12 scale measures beliefs about one’s own aging 
process. Thus, we expect that higher expectations for one’s own aging will correlate with 
an implicit bias pro-young bias, given that these individuals report that they expect 
(somewhat unrealistically) to age with less mental, physical, and cognitive health changes 
(i.e., expect to maintain current young health characteristics) than those who score lower 
on this measure, and thus are explicitly expressing a pro-young bias in their thoughts 
about themselves. Different than other explicit scales, this measure does not assess 
whether the individual has unfavorable attitudes about older adults, or if he/she views 
being old as a bad outcome. Because the ERA-12 only directly measures perceptions of 
the aging process, we expect higher scores on the IAT to be more indicative of pro-young 
biased cognitions. We also anticipate that this scale will correlate negatively with our 
mood scales, as has been shown in previous research (Li et al., 2013; Sarkisian et al., 
2005). 
 Aim 1, Hypothesis 2: The second part of the first aim of this research is to explore the 
relationship between negative mood, specifically anxiety and depression, and implicit age 
attitudes. We predict that higher reported depression and anxiety levels both would 
 12 
correlate negatively with a bias against older-aged adults (i.e., an anti-young bias). Mood 
will be captured using the Beck Depression Inventory- II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). We anticipate a negative correlation because we expect that those 
in our young adult sample who score higher on depression and/or anxiety will perceive 
the current status of their life as less desirable and thus demonstrate an anti-young bias in 
their implicit attitudes.  
 Aim 2, Hypothesis 1: Our second aim will first investigate the ability of explicit aging 
beliefs to predict implicit age attitudes. We hypothesize that explicit aging expectations 
about mental health, physical health, and cognitive function will significantly contribute 
to explaining implicit age attitudes, as measured by the Mental Health, Physical Health, 
and Cognitive Function subscales of the ERA-12 and the Age IAT, respectively. 
 Aim 2, Hypothesis 2: Our final aim is to explore whether negative mood will impact the 
relationship between explicit and implicit age attitudes. We expect that depression and 
anxiety will make a unique combined contribution to predicting implicit attitudes above 
and beyond the contributions of explicit beliefs (i.e., when controlling for these beliefs). 
That is to say, we anticipate that mood, specifically anxiety and depression levels, will 
increase the predictability of implicit age bias from explicit aging attitudes. We also 
intend to explore whether specific components of explicit attitudes and mood stand alone 
as unique predictors of implicit attitudes within their constructs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Participants and Procedure 
 Sixty-eight undergraduates (Mage = 23.5, SD = 7, 20 males, 44 Caucasian) were recruited 
from a mid-sized, Midwest, public university. Interested students over the age of 18 registered 
online via the university’s Psych Pool, an online research participant recruitment system. 
Participation took place in a private research room and lasted approximately 30- 45 minutes. All 
participants provided informed consent before beginning the study and were briefed by trained 
research assistants of the voluntary nature of their participation and the complete confidentiality 
of their responses. This data was collected as a part of a larger project examining multiple 
research questions, however, this study specifically consisted of completing a facial age IAT as 
well as self-report measures of depression, anxiety, and personal expectations about aging. 
Compensation was awarded through Psych Pool in the form of course extra credit for those who 
completed the study. The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the university’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
Measures 
 
Age Attitude IAT. Participants completed the Age Attitude IAT task developed by 
Nosek and colleagues (2007) using Inquisit (Seattle, 2013) software. This task consists of 12 
facial images, 6 young (3 male, 3 female) and 6 old (3 male, 3 female) Caucasian faces with 
neutral expressions that were cropped at the forehead and chin and displayed in black and white 
in the center of the screen (see Appendix A for task examples). The judgment categories were 
between good (i.e., joy, love, peace, wonderful, pleasure, glorious, laughter, and happy) and bad 
(i.e., agony, terrible, horrible, nasty, evil, awful, failure, and hurt) target words, presented in 
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green in the center of the screen. All stimuli were selected and presented randomly within their 
respective category for each participant.  Categorical decisions for words and images were made 
by pressing the “e” or “i” keyboard keys when the category name was shown in text in the left or 
right top corner of the screen, respectively.  
Categories were first presented in Block 1 with only “young” and “old” judgments being 
made (20 trials total, 10 young and 10 old with gender represented equally and specific images 
selected randomly), then only “good” and “bad” word judgments in Block 2 (20 trials total, 10 
good and 10 bad), to acclimate participants to the tasks. After being presented each by 
themselves, the categories were combined and presented in Blocks 3 and 4 such that the 
participant was required to select the same key for both a good/bad judgment and a young/old 
judgment. Categories were first paired congruently, that is, according to what is expected to be 
the stronger association, with “Young or Good” in the top left corner, and “Old or Bad” in the 
top right. Block 3 consisted of 20 trials and Block 4 with 40, split evenly between age and 
valence judgments and separated by a break screen which reminded the participants of the 
instructions. Block 5 followed as a reversed presentation of Block 1, that is, with the location of 
the age word category switched to acclimate the participant to a new layout and prevent 
handedness effects. Blocks 6 and 7 combined judgments (“Old or Good” and “Young or Bad”) in 
this new, counterbalanced configuration from Blocks 3 and 4. As in Blocks 3 and 4, Blocks 6 
and 7 consisted of 20 and 40 trials (respectively) split evenly between young/old judgments and 
good/bad judgments. The presentation of the task was not modified from the standard IAT 
developed by Greenwald and colleagues (2007). Trials were presented indefinitely until the 
participant gave a response. If an incorrect response was given, a red “X” appeared underneath 
the word or image. The participant was then required to remediate their choice by selecting the 
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correct response before they moved on to the next trial (see Figure 2). There was a 250 ms inter-
trial interval between selecting the correct response and the presentation of the next trial. The 
entire task took approximately 5 minutes to complete.  
Unlike most IATs, no performance feedback was given to participants to inform them of 
their scores. Scores were calculated based on the trials of Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7 (e.g., the 
congruent compared to the incongruent blocks) using the same method recommended by the 
authors of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003) with the exception of handling incorrect trials. 
Greenwald and colleagues (2003) suggest “penalizing” incorrect responses by forcing the 
participant to correct their error before moving on to the next trial, letting the extra time it takes 
for them to make this correction serve as a subjective (but varying) penalty on their total latency 
for that trial, and, if desired, adding a standard time penalty as well (e.g., 400 ms) for the error. 
To be conservative and remove the possibility of confounding cognitive processes being 
involved, we decided to calculate scores based only on correct trials, and did not use the latencies 
from incorrect trials. For our task, we excluded 8% of trials as errors (5% of the congruent; 11% 
of the incongruent). There was no significant difference between the number of errors on young 
faces compared to old faces, t(67)= -1.20, p = .24. As expected, there was a significant difference 
between the number of congruent trials and incongruent trials removed as errors, t(67) = 9.28, p 
< .001. Because there were more errors on the incongruent trials, excluding these from our 
scoring computations actually lowered the magnitude of the effect in our scores. Had these trials 
been included with a penalty, the latencies for incongruent (i.e., old-good and young-bad) trials 
would have been even longer and pushed scores more strongly towards the congruent direction 
(i.e., old-bad and young-good). Further, excluding error trials removed the possible confounds of 
additional cognitive processes being involved in these sorting decisions. The direction of the IAT 
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score value demonstrates the alignment of the preference, with positive scores indicating a pro-
young (or anti-old) bias, and negative scores indicating an anti-young (or pro-old) bias. Higher 
absolute values of IAT scores indicate a stronger preference in that direction.  
Anxiety. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) was given to 
participants to measure anxiety. The STAI is a widely-used 40-item, self-report anxiety 
inventory rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale that captures two types of anxiety: state, or event-
dependent anxiety, and trait, or persistent demonstrations of anxiety as a personal characteristic. 
It was included for the purposes of this study to capture both an individual’s short-term 
expression of anxiety (i.e., state anxiety) as restricted by directions in the instructions asking 
participants to think only of the past two weeks, and an individual’s enduring experiences of 
anxiety symptoms. Anxiety scores on the STAI are calculated by reverse-coding select responses 
and then summing the total point values of the items, with higher scores indicating higher levels 
of anxiety for both the state and trait subscales.  
Depression. Depressive symptoms were measured using the Beck Depression Inventory- 
II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II is a commonly used 21-item, multiple-
choice self-report which captures affect, cognitions, and physical symptoms of depression over 
the previous two weeks before completion. On this measure, higher scores indicate greater 
endorsement of depression symptoms. The BDI-II was considered an adequate and appropriate 
measure of current depressive mood for the purposes of this study. 
 Aging Expectations. The Shortened Expectations Regarding Aging (ERA-12) Survey 
(Sarkisian, Hays, Steers, & Mangione, 2005) is a twelve-item version of the ERA-38, a scale 
used to measure expectations regarding aging. The ERA-12 was determined using factor analysis 
into three subscales: expectations regarding physical health, mental health, and cognitive 
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function. Scores on each subscale are standardized onto a 0-100 range of possible scores. For the 
physical health subscale, higher scores demonstrate higher expectations held in regards to aging 
in the domain of physical health, and lower scores indicate lower expectations in physical health. 
Similarly, higher scores on the mental health and cognitive function subscales indicate higher 
expectations in both of those domains, with lower scores demonstrating lower expectations. 
Although this scale is typically used to measure the aging expectations of older adults, we 
included it to capture the changes predicted by participants to happen to them as they age in 
order to determine if those related to their implicit age attitudes.  
Planned Analysis 
Aim One, Hypotheses One and Two 
 The first hypothesis, which expects to support previous research by demonstrating a 
relationship between implicit age attitudes and explicit expectations regarding aging, will be 
tested through simple correlation analysis between the three ERA-12 subscales and the IAT 
scores. Similarly, we will test the prediction that depression and anxiety may negatively relate to 
implicit and explicit aging attitudes by analyzing the correlations between the BDI-II, the STAI-
S and the STAI-T with the IAT scores and ERA-12 scores.  
Aim Two, Hypothesis One 
The first hypothesis of the secondary aim will be tested by performing a multiple 
regression analysis. For this hypothesis, in which implicit age attitudes are expected to be 
predicted from explicit expectations about aging, IAT scores will be entered into the regression 
equation as the dependent variable and the three subscales of the ERA-12 will be entered 
simultaneously into the model as predictors. If any factors appear to contribute uniquely in 
themselves (i.e., beyond the contributions of the factors when considered as a grouped variable), 
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stepwise multiple-regression will be conducted to clarify these contributions for each subscale on 
predicting aging attitude scores. 
Aim Two, Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis of this aim, which predicts that individual mood differences will 
explain implicit age attitudes above and beyond the contributions of explicit beliefs, will be 
tested within the same simultaneous-entry multiple regression analysis as hypothesis one. That is 
to say, age IAT scores will be entered as the dependent variable, and ERA-12 subscales will be 
entered as explicit belief predictors in the first step. In a second step of the regression, the three 
variables of depression and anxiety scores (i.e., the BDI, STAI-S and STAI-T) will be entered 
simultaneously as predictors. By entering them in a second model of the same regression, we 
will be able to determine the variance of IAT scores explained by these variables when 
controlling for the contributions of explicit aging expectations to predict implicit scores. Similar 
to the first regression analysis to be conducted for hypothesis one, any unique contributors that 
are statistically significant on their own will have their independent contributions clarified 
through a regression analysis using stepwise-entry in both steps for entering the explicit belief 
predictors and the mood factor predictors.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Demographics and Descriptives 
Demographic information is shown in Table 1. Our sample consisted of 68 total 
participants, Mage = 23.5, SD = 7, and was predominantly female (N= 48, 71%) and Caucasian 
(N= 44, 64.7%). Descriptive statistics from measures of depression, anxiety, explicit attitudes 
about aging, and implicit age attitudes are included as well, as captured by the BDI, STAI, ERA-
12, and IAT, respectively. Overall, our sample showed a moderate preference for younger adults 
compared to older adults, which is in accord with previous literature findings (Greenwald et al., 
2003; Hummert et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2007; Mingzheng, 2005). 
  
Table 1. Summary of Demographics and Self-Report Data Descriptives  
Total N= 68 Mean (n) Standard Deviation (%) 
Gender 
     Male 
     Female 
 
20 
48 
 
29% 
71% 
Age 23.5 7 
Ethnicity 
     Caucasian 
     Hispanic 
     African-American 
     Asian 
     Other 
 
44 
3 
13 
5 
3 
 
64.7% 
4.4% 
19.1% 
7.4% 
4.4% 
Self-Report Measures 
     Age IAT 
     ERA- Physical Health 
     ERA- Mental Health 
     ERA- Cognitive Function 
     STAI- State Anxiety 
     STAI- Trait Anxiety 
     BDI 
 
.49 
29.78 
56.80 
32.35 
33.40 
39.06 
7.35 
 
.45 
13.01 
13.26 
15.53 
9.02 
9.77 
5.53 
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Simple Correlation Analyses 
To address our first hypotheses, namely, that explicit age beliefs and implicit age 
attitudes would be associated, simple correlations were conducted. Similarly, correlation 
analyses were performed to test for a relationship between depression and anxiety symptoms 
with implicit aging preferences (see Table 2). The results showed that two ERA-12 subscales 
related positively to implicit age attitude biases: higher expectations for both mental health 
(ERA- Mental) and cognitive function (ERA- Cognitive) were positively associated with an 
implicit anti-old (or pro-young) bias, r = .28, p < .05, and r = .33, p < .01. Depressive symptoms 
showed a negative relationship to implicit age bias, r = -.24, p = .05. Both state and trait anxiety 
also were negatively associated with implicit age bias, r = -.31, p = .01, and r = -.37, p < .01. All 
three mood scales, namely, state anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression, also correlated negatively 
with mental health expectations, r = -.37, p < .01, r = -.49, p < .001, and r = -.39, p < .001, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age IAT       
2. ERA-Physical .192      
3. ERA-Mental .281* .434***     
4. ERA-Cognitive .327** .354** .515***    
5. STAI-State -.311** .017 -.369** -.268*   
6. STAI-Trait -.371** -.082 -.486*** -.127 .648***  
7. BDI -.239* -.139 -.388*** -.104 .578*** .713*** 
Note: ERA-Physical = Physical Health, ERA-Mental= Mental Health, ERA-Cognitive= 
Cognitive Function, STAI-State= State Anxiety, STAI-Trait= Trait Anxiety 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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Multiple Regression Analyses 
 
Our second aim was to investigate the ability of explicit aging beliefs to predict implicit age 
attitudes, then to examine whether mood factors would also predict implicit attitudes when 
controlling for explicit beliefs. We tested our hypothesis that explicit aging expectations about 
mental health, physical health, and cognitive function and participants’ mood will significantly 
predict implicit age attitudes by conducting a multiple regression analysis with simultaneous 
entry of the variables into two steps— first the explicit measures, secondly the mood measures—
for predicting implicit age attitudes. Specifically, the mental health, physical health, and 
cognitive function subscales of the ERA were entered simultaneously into the first step, and the 
depression, state anxiety, and trait anxiety measures were entered simultaneously in the second 
step. The overall regression was significant, R = .48, R2 = .23, adjusted R2 = .16, F(6,61) = 3.06, 
p < .05 (see Table 3).  Based on the multiple correlation coefficient, implicit attitudes could be 
predicted moderately well from this set of variables, with approximately 23% of the variance 
accounted for by the regression. The first model, predicting IAT scores from only explicit 
beliefs, was significant, R = .36, R2 = .13, adj R2 = .09, F(3,64) = 3.08, p < .05. Adding 
depression and anxiety scores in a second step of the model also contributed significantly to 
explaining IAT scores when controlling for explicit beliefs, R2change= .11, Fchange(3,61)= 2.79, p < 
.05. When examining the contributors of individual predictors, trait anxiety contributed 
significantly in itself to predicting IAT scores, t(61) = -2.07, p < .05, and cognitive function was 
approaching significance at t(61) = 1.95, p = .056. The direction of these relationships were as 
expected, with higher trait anxiety predicting stronger anti-young attitudes, and higher 
expectations for cognitive function related to stronger anti-old biases.  
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Table 3. Multiple Regression Examining Predictors of Implicit Age Attitude (n= 68) 
      95% Confidence Intervals 
Predictors     B(SE) Β t p Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Full Model: F(6, 61) = 3.06, p < .05, R = .48, R2 = .23, adjusted R2 = .16  
 
Model 1:                
Constant   -.046 (.232)     -.199 .843 -.511 .418 
ERA- Mental Health      .005 (.005) .138 .958 .342 -.005 .014 
ERA- Cognitive Function  .007 (.004) .240 1.734 .088 -.001 .015 
ERA- Physical Health   .002 (.005) .047 .358 .772 -.007 .011 
Model 2: 
Constant 
ERA- Mental Health 
ERA- Cognitive Function 
ERA- Physical Health 
Depression 
State Anxiety 
Trait Anxiety 
          
1.053 (.446) 
-.003 (.005) 
.008 (.004) 
.004 (.005) 
.007 (.014) 
-.004 (.008) 
-.018 (.009) 
 
 
-.090 
.273 
.116 
.089 
-.075 
-.386 
 
2.360* 
-.561 
1.949 
.883 
.536 
-.466 
-2.065* 
 
.021 
.577 
.056 
.381 
.594 
.643 
.043 
 
.161 
-.014 
.000 
-.005 
-.020 
-.020 
-.035 
 
1.946 
.008 
.016 
.013 
.034 
.012 
-.001 
Note. All predictors simultaneously entered into the models.  
*p < .05 (2-tailed). 
**p < .01 (2-tailed). 
***p < .001 level (2-tailed).   
 
 
 In order to determine whether hypotheses regarding cognitive function and trait anxiety 
would explain implicit attitudes independent of the other scales within their construct, the 
regression analysis was repeated using a stepwise entry method for both steps. As shown in 
Table 4, the overall model was significant, R = .47, R2 = .22, adj R2 = .19, F(2,65) = 9.05, p < 
.001. The multiple correlation coefficient was .47, indicating that 22% of the variance could be 
accounted for by expectations of cognitive functioning and trait anxiety. In Step 1, explicit 
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beliefs still predicted IAT scores, R = .33, R2 = .11, adj R2 = .09, F(1,66) = 7.92, p < .01, but only 
cognitive function was entered into the model for contributing significantly in itself to predicting 
IAT scores, t(66) = 2.81, p < .01. No other explicit aging beliefs were significant, and therefore 
no other variables were entered into the first model. Step 2 was significant when controlling for 
cognitive function, R2change= .11, Fchange (1,65)=  9.19, p < .01, with trait anxiety the only 
significant mood predictor in Step 2, t(65)=  -3.03, p < .01. Cognitive function still contributed 
significantly, t(65) = 2.57, p < .05. Thus, it appears as though these two factors (ERA- Cognitive 
Function and Trait Anxiety) can successfully predict implicit age attitudes in themselves. 
 
Table 4. Stepwise Multiple Regression Predicting Implicit Age Attitudes (n=68) 
       95% Confidence Intervals 
Predictors     B(SE) Β t p Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Full Model: F (2,65) = 9.05, p < .001, R = .47, R2 = .22, adj R2 = .19.  
 
Model 1: 
Constant          .185 (.121)  1.534  .130  -.056 .426 
ERA- Cognitive Function          .009 (.003)    .327     2.814** .006   .003 .016 
Model 2: 
Constant 
 
            .827 (.240)            
  
    3.440** 
 
.001 
 
.347 
 
1.307 
ERA- Cognitive Function        .008 (.003) .285 2.574* .012 .002 .015 
Trait Anxiety         -.015 (.005) -.335 -3.031** .003 -.026 -.005 
Note. All predictors entered stepwise into the model.  
*p < .05 (2-tailed). 
**p < .01 (2-tailed). 
***p < .001 level (2-tailed).   
 
 
Discussion 
Americans are collectively becoming older and living longer. It is estimated that 19.7% 
of the U. S. population is over the age of 60, with men living an average of 76.4 years and 
women an average of 81.2 (The Economist, 2014). Because a significant portion of our society’s 
population is composed of older adults, it is important to understand and address views towards 
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older adults and aging that persist in society. There are often discrepancies between measures of 
implicit and explicit attitudes towards a subject, particularly aging, because of the conceptual 
differences between automatic and conscious preferences. Significant social implications exist 
for older adults who are treated in an age-biased way, making it important to determine the 
factors that might contribute to this discrepancy. Social desirability is thought to play a role by 
influencing the strength and severity of reporting in explicit measures (Cherry et al., 2015), but it 
does not suffice as the full explanation for the differences between these constructs. The intent of 
the present study was to explore whether differences in self-reported mood might relate to the 
implicit/explicit age attitude relationship. 
 The first aim of our study was to confirm previous findings of a relationship between 
implicit and explicit aging attitudes. We were able to replicate previous demonstrations of this 
relationship (e.g., Nosek et al., 2007) and also extend it in measuring direct views on one’s 
personal aging expectations, a nuanced difference from opinions about older age or older adults 
in a less personal context. More specifically, this measure does not assess whether the individual 
has unfavorable attitudes about older adults, or if being old is viewed as a bad outcome, but 
rather measures how realistically one anticipates their own aging to be. Higher self-reported 
expectations for one’s own mental health and cognitive function in older adulthood positively 
correlated with an implicit pro-young bias. This would suggest that holding high personal 
expectations for mental health and cognitive function may interact with implicit attitudes towards 
older aged persons, motivating these attitudes which favor young adults. These individuals who 
show an implicit preference for younger faces, explicitly express expectations to function as if 
still young beyond what would be expected in older age. Thus, this bias to view themselves as 
still functioning “as if young” in older age appears to parallel an implicit bias towards younger 
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adults. It is unclear, however, why this pattern did not hold for physical health expectations. 
However, physical health expectations were on average lower across participants than the other 
two, indicating that participants may not have as optimistic of expectations in this domain and 
thus did not report high enough beliefs for this relationship to occur. 
 Our second hypothesis predicted a relationship between measures of mood and both 
implicit and explicit attitudes. This hypothesis was supported, with depression, trait anxiety, and 
state anxiety all negatively correlating with implicit age bias. Higher reported (yet still mostly 
subclinical) mood symptoms related to a more anti-young (i.e., pro-old) bias, which is contrary 
to the overall anti-old bias commonly seen in most adults (Nosek et al., 2007). These results 
suggest that negative views about the present may relate to negative implicit views about one’s 
current age group and point in life, thus causing a shift from the typical bias found in healthy 
adults. Given the tendency for depressed individuals to perpetuate negative self-evaluations and 
the attentional bias towards schema-consistent information that is associated with depression 
(e.g., Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Alloy, Wagner, 
Black, Gerstein, & Abramson, 2011), it seems likely that this focus is linked to a negative 
implicit attitude about their own, current age group.  Similarly, the attentional bias in anxiety 
towards worry and rumination in the present (Hughes, Alloy, & Cogswell, 2008) as well as the 
association between anxiety and lower reported current quality of life (D’Avanzato et al., 2013) 
may explain the negative relationship between anxiety symptoms and age bias. For both 
depression and anxiety symptoms, it is suspected that anti-young cognitions, and not specifically 
pro-old cognitions, are responsible for driving the implicit biases in such a manner. Relations 
between anxiety and depression with explicit attitudes of expectations regarding mental health 
were also found, suggesting that individuals with poorer current mental health also expected to 
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have poorer mental health in older age. This finding has been found in other research as well 
(e.g., Li et al., 2013; Sarkisian et al., 2005) and supports our decision to use this scale as a way of 
measuring explicit attitudes. 
We also found that explicit views about aging were able to predict an implicit age-bias. 
Specifically, higher aging expectations across the three domains predicted implicit anti-old 
attitudes, suggesting that implicit age bias is at least partially explainable by one’s personal 
expectations about aging. Given that participants may not be as willing to admit explicitly ageist 
attitudes due to social acceptability perceptions, it is worth recognizing that inquiries about their 
own aging expectations may be more informative about their implicit attitudes in place of 
explicit aging attitudes. This finding adds to the body of research on the relationship between 
explicit and implicit aging views (e.g., Hummert et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2002; Mingzheng, 
2005) as well as suggests the relevance of personal aging outlook for understanding implicit 
ageist attitudes that influence behavior toward others. Further, our results indicated that mood 
was able to predict implicit attitudes above and beyond the ability of explicit beliefs. Individuals’ 
mood factors of depression and anxiety uniquely contributed to explaining implicit age attitudes 
when controlling for explicit beliefs, supporting our hypothesis that mood factors are beneficial 
to consider when interpreting implicit attitudes. Negative mood is often thought to bias how one 
views themselves and the world around them. From these findings, it would appear as though the 
impact of negative mood may go a step further, biasing implicit attitudes about age as well. 
Previous research has found that depression impacts implicit self-esteem attitudes, with currently 
depressed individuals demonstrating lower implicit self-esteem than non-depressed or remitted 
depressive patients (Risch et al., 2010). Also, acute, induced stress has been shown to impact 
implicit but not explicit depression and self-esteem (Creemers et al., 2013), thus reconfirming the 
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need to explore factors that could influence both constructs. The findings of the current study 
illuminate the key role that mood plays in influencing implicit and explicit age attitudes. Because 
previous implicit attitudes research has not examined this topic specifically in the context of 
aging, it is important for future research to explore the role that mood might play on implicit 
attitudes relevant to one’s self-image.  
When exploring the unique contributions of our explicit and mood variables in predicting 
implicit age attitudes, we found that expectations regarding cognitive function in particular 
significantly predicted anti-age bias. Thus, it would appear that expectations regarding cognitive 
function and performance in older age are particularly salient in identifying implicit age biases. 
Whereas physical health expectations in older age have been shown to relate to physical activity 
levels (Meisner, Weir, & Baker, 2013; Sarkisian, Prohaska, Wong, Hirsch, & Mangione, 2005), 
expectations of mental and cognitive health have not revealed this connection. Thus, it is 
possible that these two constructs relate more strongly to implicit aging attitudes than physical 
health, because they appear less controllable and thus an unavoidable consequence of older age. 
This explanation fits well with the correlational relationships we found, but does not explain why 
only expectations of cognitive functioning, and not mental health, could significantly predict 
implicit attitudes. We speculate that perhaps mental health is perceived as more medically 
manageable than declining cognitive functioning, but future research would be necessary to 
clarify the mechanisms behind the perception of control and inevitability in these constructs. The 
impact of expectations regarding cognitive functioning still held when adding mood factors into 
the model, of which only trait anxiety was able to independently predict implicit attitudes. 
General trait anxiety likely showed this relationship through an overlap with aging-specific 
anxiety, which is known to relate to stronger anti-old attitudes (Wisdom et al., 2014). The 
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relationship between trait anxiety and explicit attitudes is likely different, encompassing a worry 
about future personal health and performance. Thus, trait anxiety may play a notably important 
role in how explicit and implicit biases are manifested. This analysis provided clarification for 
the individual predictive abilities of cognitive functioning expectations and trait anxiety in how 
they concurrently aid in the prediction of implicit age bias. 
Our study has several limitations to be noted. First, in choosing to use a young adult 
sample, we are not able to generalize our findings to how older adults’ implicit and explicit 
views on aging may be impacted by mood. However, given previous research demonstrating that 
older adults hold an anti-old bias similar to younger adults (Nosek et al., 2007), we speculate that 
the role mood might have on older adults would be to strengthen negative attitudes towards their 
current, older age. Future research in this area would be useful in confirming or denying this 
speculation. Also, our sample was primarily Caucasian (64.7%), and the facial images were all 
Caucasian. Thus, it is difficult to determine from our findings whether differences may exist 
between judgments of different ethnic groups and if in-group or out-group bias may have 
influenced performance when performing the task with Caucasian-only images. Also, mood was 
measured by using self-reports, which, though generally considered accurate in estimating 
symptoms, is nonetheless subject to reporting biases. Future research would benefit from a more 
inclusive measurement of mood variations including a clinical interview, as well as from 
longitudinal information relating to whether implicit attitudes change if mood states change or if 
mood-related traits (e.g., anxiety) are addressed through treatment. If changes in mood over time 
impact implicit attitudes, then those findings may suggest additional benefits for considering 
age-related attitudes in treatments of anxiety and depression. 
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The IAT task itself presents limitations worth noting. Although it was chosen for this 
study in order to validate our findings against the most commonly used measure of implicit age 
attitudes, the IAT has weaknesses in its stimuli and its scoring. First, although the facial images 
were cropped around the eyes and nose to minimize any effects of perceived emotion, it is 
possible that there are still perceivable differences between the young and old faces, particularly 
a sense of negative emotion in the older face. Because we did not control for this, it is difficult to 
say whether the facial images used may have influenced sorting speeds when paired with bad 
compared to good words. Also, the ethnicities represented in the task were limited to Caucasians. 
Replicating the findings of this study with facial images updated to better control for emotional 
expression and more inclusive of ethnic diversity would clarify these possible confounds and 
extend the generalizability. Also, it is important to note that the IAT measure provides overall 
preference scores, but does not discriminate specifically between young preference ratings and 
old preference ratings. Thus, it is possible that, for example, strong anti-old attitudes may be 
exists with strong pro-young or neutrally pro-young feelings in an individual and be captured by 
a similar score. In general, explicit measures can clarify the dominant attitude behind an IAT 
score, but these measures have limitations as well. In our study, pro-young sentiments with 
regards to one’s own aging are thought to suggest that the higher IAT scores found in these 
individuals is indicative of stronger pro-young than possibly anti-old attitudes. A more recently-
developed measure, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2006) has been developed to combat this issue by measuring preferences for each category 
involved, not relative to the opposite choice. It has been implemented successfully in areas such 
as weight and sexual attitudes research (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 
2009; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2009) and correlates well with IAT measures. Using a 
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tool such as the IRAP to discriminate between pro-young and anti-old biases could be beneficial 
for future research to determine the attitudinal differences underlying the relationships we found 
with explicit aging expectations and mood factors. 
Our study was the first of its kind to explore the crucial role that mood plays in impacting 
implicit age attitudes. Further, it illuminated the link between personal aging beliefs and implicit 
attitudes in addition to that which explicit ageist prejudice has already shown. In highlighting the 
importance of considering mood factors when predicting and interpreting implicit aging biases, 
this research testifies to the potential pliability of implicit attitudes. Additionally, depression and 
anxiety become important facets in unraveling the fundamentals of implicit attitudes because of 
the impact such symptoms can have on life outlook. Understanding age attitudes, both implicit 
and explicit, is imperative in order to understand how age attitudes are created, maintained, and 
manifested in interactions. Because implicit attitudes may affect behaviors and responses to older 
adults below conscious awareness, being able to predict these attitudes is necessary for 
determining how to change age attitudes and thereby impact how older adults are treated. 
Additionally, these findings are important because of how one’s attitudes towards aging are 
known to influence health-related behaviors (e.g., physical activity; Sparks, Meisner, & Young, 
2013) and one’s future health (Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002). Thus, the benefits to 
addressing ageist attitudes are two-fold: reducing negative stereotyped behaviors towards older 
adults, and improving the health outcomes of younger adults. Because the expression of explicit 
and implicit attitudes can differ, it is valuable to identify how and when they differ, and when 
they are similar in predicting behavior. Explicit expectations of aging may portray a more 
accurate image of one’s implicit biases, but depressive and anxious symptoms hold an important 
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role in understanding that relationship. The effect of mood on explaining implicit ageist attitudes 
from beliefs about aging brings new insight in comprehending the nature of implicit attitudes.  
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Appendix A 
Age IAT 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5. Display example when judging “young” vs. “old.”  
Figures A1, A2, A3, & A4. Two female and 
two males examples of the images judged as 
“old” or “young” in this task. 
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 Figure A7. Display example when judging “good” vs. “bad.” 
Figure A6. Instructions for judging both young/old and good/bad. 
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Figure A8. Display example after an incorrect response. 
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Appendix B 
Beck Depression Inventory- II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) 
 
Choose the one statement, from among the group of four statements in each question that best describes how 
you have been feeling during the past few days.  Circle the number beside your choice.  
1        0     I do not feel sad. 
       1     I feel sad. 
       2     I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
       3     I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it. 
2        0     I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
       1     I feel discouraged about the future. 
       2     I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
       3     I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
3        0     I do not feel like a failure. 
       1     I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
       2     As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failure. 
       3     I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
4 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
1 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don’t get any real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
3     I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
5 0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
6        0     I don’t feel that I am being punished. 
       1     I feel I may be punished. 
       2     I expect to be punished. 
       3     I feel I am being punished. 
7 0 I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
8 0 I don’t feel I am worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2 I blame myself all the time for faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10 0 I don’t cry anymore than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all the time now. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
11 0 I am not more irritated by things than I ever am. 
1 I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
2 I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. 
3     I feel irritated all the time now. 
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(BDI continued) 
 
 
 
 
12 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
3 I have lost all my interest in other people. 
13 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have a greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3 I can’t make decisions at all anymore. 
14 0     I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to. 
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive. 
3     I believe that I look ugly. 
15 0     I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can’t do any work at all. 
16 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
17 0 I don’t get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
18        0     My appetite is no worse than usual. 
       1     My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
       2     My appetite is much worse now. 
       3     I have no appetite at all anymore. 
19        0     I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately. 
       1     I have lost more than five pounds. 
       2     I have lost more than ten pounds. 
       3     I have lost more than fifteen pounds trying to lose weight. 
Score 0 if you have been purposely trying to lose weight. 
20        0     I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
       1     I am worried about my physical problems such as aches and pains or upset stomach. 
       2     I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think of much else. 
       3     I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else. 
21        0     I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
       1     I am less interested in sex. 
       2     I am much less interested in sex. 
       3     I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Appendix C 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1977) 
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Appendix D 
Expectations Regarding Aging Scale (ERA-12; Sarkisian et al., 2005) 
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING AGING  
(Short Version, Physical Health , Mental Health, and  
Cognitive Function Scales) 
 
 This survey has questions about what you expect about aging.   
 Please check the ONE box to the right of the statement that best corresponds with 
how you feel about the statement.  If you are not sure, go ahead and check the box 
that you think BEST corresponds with your feelings.    
 
 Definitely 
True 
 
Somewhat 
True 
 
Somewhat 
False 
 
Definitely 
False 
 
1. When people get older, they need 
to lower their expectations of how 
healthy they can be.   1 2 3 4 
2. The human body is like a car: when 
it gets old, it gets worn out.  
1 2 3 4 
3. Having more aches and pains is an 
accepted part of aging.  
1 2 3 4 
4. Every year that people age, their 
energy levels go down a little 
more. 1 2 3 4 
5. I expect that as I get older I will 
spend less time with friends and 
family.   1 2 3 4 
6. Being lonely is just something that 
happens when people get old.   
1 2 3 4 
7. Quality of life declines as people 
age.  
1 2 3 4 
8. It’s normal to be depressed when 
you are old.  
1 2 3 4 
 40 
9. I expect that as I get older I will 
become more forgetful.   
1 2 3 4 
10. It’s an accepted part of aging to 
have trouble remembering names.  
1 2 3 4 
11. Forgetfulness is a natural 
occurrence just from growing old.  
1 2 3 4 
12. It is impossible to escape the 
mental slowness that happens with 
aging.   1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
References 
Allan, L. J., & Johnson, J. A. (2009). Undergraduate attitudes toward the elderly: The role of
 knowledge, contact and aging anxiety. Educational Gerontology, 35, 1-14. 
Alloy, L. B., Wagner, C. A., Black, S. K., Gerstein, R. K., & Abramson, L. Y. (2011). The
 breakdown of self-enhancing and self-protecting cognitive biases in depression. In M. C.
 Alicke and C. Sedikides (Eds.), Handbook of self-enhancement and self-protection (pp.
 358- 379). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Hayden, E., Milne, R., Power, P., & Stewart, I. (2006).
 Do you really know what you believe? Developing the Implicit Relational Assessment
 Procedure as a direct measure of implicit beliefs. The Irish Psychologist, 32, 169-177. 
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York,
 NY: Harper and Row. 
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression.
 New York: NY: Guilford Press. 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A., Ball, R., and Ranieri, W.F. (1996). Comparison of Beck Depression
 Inventories-IA and-II in Psychiatric Outpatients. Journal of Personality Assessment 67,
 588-597. 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. G. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory- II.
 San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
 42 
Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., Klick, J., Mellers, B., Mitchell, G., & Tetlock, P. E. (2009). Strong
 claims and weak evidence: Reassessing the predictive validity of the IAT. Journal of
 Applied Psychology, 94(3), 567- 582. 
Bousfield, C., & Hutchison, P. (2010). Contact, anxiety, and young people’s attitudes and
 behavioral intentions towards the elderly. Educational Gerontology, 36, 451–466.
 doi:10.1080/03601270903324362 
Castelli, L., Zecchini, A., Deamicis, L., & Sherman, S. (2005). The impact of implicit prejudice
 about the elderly on the reaction to stereotype confirmation and disconfirmation. Current
 Psychology, 24(2), 134-146. 
Cherry, K. E., Allen, P. D., Denver, J. Y., & Holland, K. R. (2015). Contributions of social
 desirability to self-reported ageism. Journal of Applied Gerontology, 34(6), 712-733. 
Clark, D. A., Beck, A. T., & Alford, B. A. (1999). Scientific foundations of cognitive theory
 and therapy of depression. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Coates, M. A., & Campbell, K. B. (2010). Event-related potential measures of processing during
 an Implicit Association Test. NeuroReport, 21(16), 1029-1033. 
Creemers, D. H. M., Scholte, R. H. J., Engels, R. C. M. E., Pieters, S., & Wiers, R. W. (2013).
 Acute stress increases implicit depression and decreases implicit self-esteem. Journal of
 Experimental Psychopathology, 4(2), 118-132.  
D’Avanzato, C., Martinez, J., Attiullah, N., Friedman, M., Toba, C., Boerescu, D. A., &
 Zimmerman, M. (2013). Anxiety symptoms among remitted depressed outpatients:
 43 
 Prevalence and association with quality of life and psychosocial functioning. Journal of
 Affective Disorders, 151(1), 401-404. 
Dawson, D. L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Gresswell, D. M., Hart, A. J., & Gore, N. J. (2009).
 Assessing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the Implicit Relational
 Assessment Procedure: A first study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and
 Treatment, 21(1), 57-75. 
Disner, S. G., Beevers, C. G., Haigh, E. A. P., & Beck, A. T. (2011). Neural mechanisms of the
 cognitive model of depression. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 12, 467- 477. doi:
 10.1038/nrn3027 
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic
 activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2), 229-238. 
Greenberg, J., Schimel, J., & Martens, A. (2002). Ageism: Denying the face of the future. In T.
 D. Nelson (Ed.), Ageism: Stereotyping and prejudice against older persons (pp. 27–48).
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and
 stereotypes. Psychology Review, 102(1), 4-27. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual
 differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality
 and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1464- 1480. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2001). Health of the Implicit Association Test at age 3.
 Zeitschrift fur Experimentelle Psychologie, 48(2), 85-93. 
 44 
Greenwald, A.G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit
 Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social
 Psychology, 85(2), 197-216. 
Harris, L. A., & Dollinger, S. (2001). Participation in a course on aging: Knowledge, attitudes,
 and anxiety about aging in oneself and others. Educational Gerontology, 27, 657- 667. 
Huang, P., Yang, Zhibing, Miao, D., Lu, H., & Zhu, X. (2012). Trait anxiety among
 undergraduates according to the Implicit Association Test. Psychological Reports:
 Mental and Physical Health, 111(1), 13-23. 
Hughes, M. E., Alloy, L. B., & Cogswell, A. (2008). Repetitive thought in psychopathology: The
 relation between rumination and worry to depression and anxiety symptoms. Journal of
 Cognitive Psychotherapy, 22(3), 271- 288. 
Hummert, M. L., Garstka, T. A., O’Brien, L. T., Greenwald, A. G., & Mellott, D. S. (2002).
 Using the Implicit Association Test to measure age differences in implicit social
 cognitions. Psychology and Aging, 17(3), 482-495. 
Hutchinson, P., Fox, E., Laas, A. M., Matharu, J., & Urzi, S. (2010). Anxiety, outcome
 expectancies, and young people’s willingness to engage in contact with the elderly.
 Educational Gerontology, 36, 1008-1021. 
Levy, B. R., Slade, M. D., Kunkel, S. R., & Kasl, S. V. (2002). Longevity increased by positive
 self-perceptions of aging. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 261- 270. 
McConnell, A. R., & Leibold, J. M. (2009). Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to
 Blanton et al. (2009). Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(3), 583-589. 
 45 
Meisner, B. A., Weir, P. L., & Baker, J. (2013). The relationship between aging expectations and
 various modes of physical activity among aging adults. Psychology of Sport and Exercise,
 14(4), 569- 576. 
Millisecond Software (2013). Inquisit (Version 4.0) [Software]. Available from
 http://www.millisecond.com 
Mingzheng, W. (2005). The moderator effect of attitude strength on the relationship between
 implicit attitude and explicit attitude. Psychological Science (China), 28(2), 388-391. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1998). A cognitive–motivational analysis of anxiety. Behaviour
 Research & Therapy, 36, 809–848. 
Montepare, J. M., & Zebrowitz, L. A. (2002). A social-developmental view of ageism. In T.
 Nelson (Ed.), Ageism (pp. 77-125). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effect on the duration of
 depressed mood. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 569–582. 
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Harvesting intergroup implicit attitudes
 and beliefs from a demonstration Web site. Group Dynamics, 6(1), 101– 115. 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). Understanding and using the Implicit
 Association Test: II. Method variables and construct validity. Personality and Social
 Psychology Bulletin, 31(2), 166-180. 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2007). The Implicit Association Test at age 7:
 A methodological and conceptual review. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Automatic processes in
 social thinking and behavior (pp. 265-292). Psychology Press. 
 46 
Nosek, B. A., & Smyth, F. L. (2007). A multitrait-multidimensional validation of the Implicit
 Association Test: Implicit and explicit attitudes are related but distinct constructs.
 Experimental Psychology, 54(1), 14-29. 
Nosek, B. A., Smyth, F. L., Hansen, J. J., Devos, T., Lindner, N. M., Ratliff (Ranganath), K. A.,
 Smith, C. T., Olson, K. R., Chugh, D., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2007).
 Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. European Review of
 Social Psychology, 18, 36-88. 
Peckham, A., McHugh, R., & Otto, M. (2010). A meta analysis of the magnitude of biased
 attention in depression. Depression and Anxiety, 27(12), 1135-1142.  
Risch, A. K., Buba, A., Birk, U., Morina, N., Steffens, M. C., & Stangier, U. (2010). Implicit
 self-esteem in recurrently depressed patients. Journal of Behavior Therapy and
 Experimental Psychiatry, 41(3), 199-206. 
Roddy, S., Stewart, I., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2009). Anti-fat ,pro-slim, or both? Using two
 reaction-time based measures to assess implicit attitudes to the slim and overweight.
 Journal of Health Psychology, 15(3), 416-425. 
Sarkisian, C.A., Steers, W.N., Hays, R. D., & Mangione, C.M. (2005). Development of the 12
 item Expectations Regarding Aging (ERA-12) Survey. Gerontologist, 45, 240-248. 
Sarkisian, C. A., Prohaska, T. R., Wong, M. D., Hirsch, S., & Mangione, C. M. (2005). The
 relationship between expectations for aging and physical activity among older adults.
 Journal of General Internal Medicine, 20(10), 911-915. 
 47 
Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2005). A latent state-trait analysis of implicit and explicit
 personality measures. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21(2), 100–107. 
Sparks, C. R., Meisner, B. A., & Young, B. W. (2013). Investigating general and self
 expectations regarding aging in a physical activity context. International Journal of
 Sports Psychology, 44(1), 17-36. 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for
 the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
The Economist (2014). The Economist pocket world in figures: 2015 Edition. London: Profile
 Books Ltd. 
Wang, S. S., Brownell, K. D., & Wadden, T. A. (2004). The influence of the stigma of obesity on
 overweight individuals. International Journal of Obesity, 28, 133-1337. 
Wisdom, N. M., Connor, D. R., Hogan, L. R., & Callahan, J. L. (2014). The relationship of
 anxiety and beliefs toward aging in ageism. Journal of Scientific Psychology, 10-21. 
Li, X., Lv, Q., Li, C., Zhang, H., Li, C., & Jin, J. (2013). The relationship between expectations
 regarding aging and functional health status among older adults in Chine. Journal of
 Nursing Scholarship, 45(4), 328-335. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
VITA 
Norah Celeste Hass was born on August 13, 1990, to Mike and Jeanne Hass in South 
Bend, Indiana. Having relocated to Burnsville, Minnesota, in 1991, Norah graduated from high 
school in 2008 at Trinity School at River Ridge, a private, Christian high school also in the Twin 
Cities. She then attended the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana, and graduated in 
2012 with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology. Norah worked for a year after graduation at the 
United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory in Fort Rucker, Alabama, as a 
Psychology Technician supporting research projects on aircrew and soldier health and 
performance. In the fall of 2013, Norah began pursuit of a doctoral degree in Clinical Health 
Psychology at the University of Missouri- Kansas City. She currently works under the 
mentorship of Dr. Seung-Lark Lim and balances her training foci between clinical practice and 
experimental research. 
